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Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial Independence

This Article uses comparative evidence to inform the ongoing debate about the selection
and discipline of judges. In recent decades, many countries around the world have created
judicial councils, institutions designed to maintain an appropriate balance between
judicial independence and accountability. Our Article has two aims. First, we provide a
theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along
which they differ. Second, we test the extent to which different designs of judicial council
affect judicial quality. We find that there is little relationship between councils and
quality. We also offer a positive explanation for why judicial councils nevertheless
remain attractive institutions.
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I. Introduction
The selection of judges is a central factor in most theories of judicial
independence. 1 Judges who are dependent in some way upon the person who appoints
them cannot be relied upon to deliver neutral, legitimate, high-quality decisions. While
there is near-universal consensus on this as a matter of theory, legal systems have devised
a wide range of selection mechanisms in practice, often trying to balance independence
with accountability through institutional design. The diversity of systems of judicial
selection suggests that there is no consensus on the best manner to guarantee
independence. 2
At the same time, there is a trend toward insulating judicial selection from
partisan politics. In the United States, this is reflected in the growing scholarly consensus
in favor of “merit selection.” 3 In other countries, it is reflected in the adoption of judicial
1

There is a large body of literature on judicial independence and quality. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The
Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice, BYU L. REV., at 827 (1990); Paul
Fenn & Eli Salzberger, Judicial Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 831 (1999); F. Andrew Hannsen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 712 (2004); Irving Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
671 (1980); Daniel Klerman & Paul Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from 18th
Century England, 7 AM. L & ECON. REV. 1 (2005); William Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent
Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling
(In)dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Judicial
Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997);
McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 105 (2006); William H.
Rehnquist, See in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, WIS. L. REV. 1 (1993). For a more
comparative perspective, see Josefina Calca de Temeltas, Commentary: Comparative Constitutional
Approaches to the Rule of Law and Judicial Independence, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. l997 (1996).
2

See generally APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell
eds., 2006).
3

Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106 DICKERSON L. REV. 729
(2002) (providing summary of empirical evidence); Luke Bierman, Preserving Power in Picking Judges:
Merit Selection for the New York Court of Appeals, 60 ALB. L. REV. 339 (1996) (advocating merit system
for New York); Norman L. Greene, Perspectives on Judicial Selection Reform: The Need to Develop a
Model Appointive Selection Plan for Judges in Light of Experience, 68 ALB. L. REV. 459 (2005) (merit
system superior); Steven Zeidman, Keynote Address, Judicial Politics: Making the Case for Merit
Selection, 68 ALB. L. REV. 713 (2005); Lawrence H. Avrill, Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience
with Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 281 (1995)
(Arkansas); Sara S. Greene, et al., On the Validity and Vitality of Arizona’s Judicial Merit Selection
System: Past, Present, and Future, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239 (2007) (Arizona); Victoria Cecil, Merit
Selection and Retention: The Great Compromise? Not Necessarily, 39 COURT REV. 20 (2002) (Florida);
Jason J. Czarnezki, Essay, A Call for Change: Improving Judicial Selection Methods, OR. L. REV. 459
(2005) (Wisconsin); Lenore L. Prather, Judicial Selection: What is Right for Mississippi?, 72 MISS. C.L.
REV. 459 (2002) (Mississippi); Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status Procedures, and Issues,
49 U. M IAMI L. REV. 1 (1994) (providing extensive history of merit selection and arguing for the merit
plan); Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions: Independence, Accountability,
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councils, an international “best practice” designed to help ensure judicial independence
and external accountability. We thus see the emergence of a new orthodoxy—merit
selection is good and other methods are retrograde. Because there are few common
metrics to evaluate the comparative independence or quality of judiciaries, the new
scholarly consensus is largely theoretical, built on anecdotal rather than systematic
evidence.4
This Article describes the global spread of judicial councils and provides a theory
of their formation and features. By our estimate, over sixty percent of countries have
some form of judicial council, up from ten percent thirty years ago. 5 We also provide
some evidence as to whether different designs of judicial council affect judicial quality.
Although we find that there is little relationship between council adoption and quality, the
Article argues that the eternal struggle for a balance between independence and
accountability ensures that judicial councils will continue to be a locus of institutional
reform. Yet there are limits to the efficacy of institutional solutions to problems of
judicial independence. Although councils serve as an arena for contestation for various
groups with an interest in judicial performance, they do not by themselves guarantee the
substantive outputs of independence and quality.
The Article is organized as follows. First, we discuss the emergence of judicial
councils. We then provide a theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify
some of the dimensions along which they differ. Next, we test the extent to which
different designs of judicial council affect judicial quality. We find that there is little
and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 78 (2007); Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for
Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 1 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 273
(2002) (arguing for appointment over election); Norman L. Greene, A Critical Appraisal of Appointive
Selection for State Court Judges: The Judicial Independence Through Fair Appointments Act, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 13 (2007) (same); G. Alan Tarr, Designing an Appointive System: The Key Issues, 34
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 291 (2007) (same); Jeffery D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial
Selection and Their Application to a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 459
(2007); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 689 (1995) (judicial elections undermine rule of law); Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The
Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206
(1997).
4

But see Stephen J. Choi et al., Judicial Independence, Judicial Quality and the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty: An Empirical Test Using Data from State Supreme Courts (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998536 (finding that judges in partisan systems are
more productive in terms of number of opinions, but that appointed judges are cited more frequently).
5

Diffusion data on file with authors.
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relationship between council design and quality.

Our theory nevertheless offers a

positive explanation for why judicial councils remain attractive institutions. Finally, we
conclude with a discussion of the implications of the analysis.
II. The Tension Between Accountability and Independence
A long and established literature argues that the ideal of judicial independence is a
crucial quality of legal systems, and indeed inherent in the notion of judging. 6 Naturally,
the ideal is not always met, for it remains the case that in every legal system judges are
appointed and employed by the state. It would be unusual indeed if judges did not have a
role in implementing social policy, broadly conceived. 7 In democracies, this implies the
need for some accountability of judges. While judicial independence is widely studied, 8
accountability has been the subject of much less inquiry. It requires that the judiciary as
a whole maintain some level of responsiveness to society, as well as a high level of
professionalism and quality on the part of its members. This section discusses judicial
councils as devices to ensure both independence and accountability.
A. Judicial Councils in Civil Law and Common Law Systems

6

See the recent volume J UDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
(Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2003).
7

MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981).

8

See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Identifying "Independence,” 86 B.U. L. REV. 1297 (2006) (identifying formal
and informal pressure on the judiciary); Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315 (1999) (explaining judicial independence in contemporary American history);
Archibald Cox, The Independence of Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 565 (1996)
(discussing historical reasons for judicial independence); John Ferejohn & Larry Kramer, Independent
Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L.REV. 962 (2002) (arguing
that independence and accountability aim at a well-functioning system of adjudication); John Ferejohn,
Judicializing Politics, Politicizing the Law, 65 LAW & CONT. PROBS. 45 (2002); John Ferejohn,
Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353
(1999) (discussing institutional protections for judges and the judiciary and explaining interest theories of
judicial independence); Gordon Bermant & Russell Wheeler, Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch:
Their Independence and Accountability, 46 MERCER L. REV. (1995) (identifying different levels of
independence, including decisional independence, personal independence, procedural independence,
administrative independence; and different levels of accountability, namely internal vs. external
accountability); Frank Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence, 72 S.
CAL. L. REV. 625-56 (1999) (discussing institutional versus decisional independence); also Burbank &
Friedman, supra note 6.

4

Judicial councils are bodies that are designed to insulate the functions of
appointment, promotion, and discipline of judges from the partisan political process
while ensuring some level of accountability. Judicial councils lie somewhere in between
the polar extremes of letting judges manage their own affairs and the alternative of
complete political control of appointments, promotion, and discipline. The first model of
judicial self-management arguably errs too far on the side of independence, while pure
political control may make judges too accountable in the sense that they will consider the
preferences of their political principals in the course of deciding specific cases. There are
a wide variety of models of councils, in which the composition and competences reflect
the concern about the judiciary in a specific context, balancing between demands for
accountability and independence.
France established the first High Council of the Judiciary (Conseil Superieur de la
Magistrature) in 1946.9 It was in charge of managing judicial personnel but only a
minority of members were themselves magistrates elected directly by fellow judges. 10
Italy’s judicial council (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura), created in 1958, was
the first to fully insulate the entire judiciary from political control, a model that has been
followed in other judicial reforms.11

Spain12 and Portugal 13 have slightly different

9

A precursor for judicial councils can be seen in the use of formal nominations committees composed of
various governmental officials. See, e.g., Constitution of Albania, 1925 (judicial nominations from special
committee of judges, prosecutors, and Minister of Justice).
10

In the Fifth Republic, the President of the Republic took over the appointments of all the members and
reinstated most of the traditional powers of the Minister of Justice and higher-ranking judges. The
cohabitation period in the 1980s eventually led to another reform (Loi Constitutionnelle of July 1993 and
Loi Organique of Feb. 1994). The Council has two committees, one for judges and another one for
prosecutors. The Council has a total of sixteen members. Each committee has one administrative judge
chosen by the administrative judges (Conseil d’État) and three individuals chosen by the President, the
Senate, and the National Assembly each. For the judicial committee, it has also five judges elected by the
fellow judges and one prosecutor chosen by the fellow prosecutors; for the prosecutorial committee, it has
one judge elected by the fellow judges and five prosecutors for the prosecutorial formation. The President
and the Minister of Justice sit ex officio. See Cheryl Thomas, Judicial Appointments in Continental Europe,
Lord Chancellor’s Department, Research Series 6/97, 1997.
11

The Italian Council was made up of thirty-three members, twenty magistrates elected directly by the
judges, ten lawyers or law professors nominated by the Parliament, and the President, the Chief-Justice, and
the Chief-Prosecutor all serving ex officio. It has been reformed recently to include only twenty-four
members, sixteen ordinary magistrates and prosecutors and eight lawyers or law professors with fifteen
years experience in the legal profession, all of whom are appointed by the Parliament. See Thomas, supra
note 10.

5

models introduced after the fall of the dictatorships in the mid 1970s, in which judges
constitute a significant proportion of the members. These councils have final decisionmaking in all cases of promotion, tenure, and removal. Judicial salaries are also
technically within their authority but usually tempered by the department in charge of the
budget (typically the Ministry of Finance). The power of high-ranking magistrates has
been dramatically reduced in most of these countries (as a consequence of junior-ranking
judges being appointed to the judicial council) and strong unions or judicial associations
have emerged.14
The French and Italian cases were motivated by a concern about excessive
politicization and consequently granted extensive independence to the judicial power.
After some time, however, courts became more extensively involved in politics and
accountability issues came to the fore. For example, in France, reforms in the 1990s were
clearly driven by political events that have empowered the judiciary. Although the Fifth
Republic maintained the traditional subordination of the French judiciary to the executive
and the legislature, and the rather docile judiciary exercised individual and collective
judicial self-restraint, conflicts began to develop in the late 1960s and 1970s. 15 The
consolidation of judicial review by the Constitutional Council in the mid-1970s had a
major and enduring impact.

The sharp increase in litigation, both civil and

administrative, the criminalization of many activities, and the extension of the scope of
application of the European Convention of Human Rights, all served to increase the
12

The Spanish Council (Consejo General del Poder Judicial) has twenty members, twelve judges and eight
lawyers all appointed by the Parliament and the Chief-Justice ex officio. For prosecutors, there is a council
made up of twelve prosecutors (Consejo Fiscal).
13

There are three councils in Portugal, one for judicial courts (Conselho Superior da Magistratura), one for
administrative courts (Conselho Superior dos Tribunais Administrativos e Fiscais), and one for prosecutors
(Conselho Superior do Ministério Público).
14

A good summary can be found in Thierry-Serge Renoux, 2000, Les Conseils Supérieurs de la
Magistrature en Europe, Documentation Française (Coll. Perspectives sur la justice). About the
unionization of the judiciary, see Willem de Haan et al., Radical French Judges: Syndicat de la
Magistrature, 16 J.L. & SOC’Y 477-82 (1989) (explaining the role of the union of judges).
15

See Michael. H. Davis, A Government of Judges: An Historical Re-View, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 559 (1987)
(explaining why the American government of judges is disliked by the French legal scholars); John Bell,
Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1757 (1988); ALEC STONE, THE
BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN F RANCE (1992); Vincent Wright, The Fifth Republic: From the Droit
d’Etat to the Etat de Droit?, 22 W. EUR. POL. 92 (1999), and Dories Marie Provine & Antoine Garapon,
The Selection of Judges in France: Searching for a New Legitimacy, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF
JUDICIAL POWER 176 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006).

6

influence of the French judiciary. At the same time, several political scandals gave the
judiciary an important influence over politics. France, with its tradition of viewing the
judiciary as a faceless collectivity dispensing justice, was now faced with a new kind of
celebrity.16 Though the judiciary as a whole is still quite self-restrained, a number of
individual judges gained notoriety because of their role in investigating political scandals.
This in turn has led to the introduction of a debate about the lack of external
accountability of judges. 17
The pattern in Italy is similar. The Italian judicial system is notable for its extreme
independence, in which the judicial council controls virtually all aspects of judicial
appointment and promotion for the ordinary judiciary.

18

The balance of power on the

council is clearly in the hands of the judiciary, and since the internal hierarchy of the
judiciary has largely been undermined, all decisions on the status of magistrates are tak en
by the council. Prominent scandal investigations related to businessmen, politicians, and
bureaucrats marked the period from 1992 to 1997, raising questions about judicial
accountability. 19 Consequently, the composition of the council was altered in 2002 to
increase the influence of the Parliament.
The French-Italian model has been exported to Latin America and other
developing countries. 20 Indeed, the World Bank and other multilateral donor agencies
have made judicial councils part of the standard package of institutions associated with

16

See Doris Marie Provine, Courts in the Political Process in France, in COURTS, LAW AND POLITICS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, at 203-04 (Herbert Jacob et al., eds., 1996)..
17

VALÉRY TURCEY, LE CONSEIL S UPERIEUR
(2005).
18

DE LA

MAGISTRATURE FRANÇAIS: B ILAN

ET

PERSPECTIVES

See Thomas, supra note 10.

19

Patrizia Pederzoli, The Reform of the Judiciary in ITALIAN POLITICS: QUO VADIS 153-71 (Carlo
Guarnieri & James Newell eds., 2004); David Nelken, The Judges and Political Corruption in Italy, in
T HE C ORRUPT ION OF P OLIT ICS AND THE P OLIT ICS OF C ORRUPT ION 95-112 (Michael Levi & David
Nelken eds., 1996); Carlo Guarnieri, Judicial Independence in Latin Countries in Western Europ ,
in J UDIC IAL INDEPENDENCE IN T HE AGE OF D EMOCRACY , C RITICAL P ERSPECT IVES AROUND THE
WORLD (Peter Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001).
20

See, e.g., Rebecca Bill Chavez, The Appointment and Removal Process for Judges in Argentina: The Role
of Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries in Promoting Judicial Independence, 49 LATIN AMERICAN
POL. & SOC. 33 (2005) (Argentina). Some refer to a distinction between a “Northern European Model”
more focused on management concerns and a “Southern European Model” that is constitutionalized and
focusing on structural independence. Wim Voermans & Pim Albers, Councils for the Judiciary in EU
Countries, European Council for the Efficiency of Justice, CEPEJ (2003). We reject this distinction as
unhelpful, but rather develop an index of powers and competences discussed infra, section V.

7

judicial reform and rule of law programming. 21 Efforts to produce model “best practices”
have ensured much replication and refinement of the judicial council model.

For

example, the Association of European Magistrates for Democracy and Freedom
(MEDEL) produced a Draft Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights, called the Elements of European Statute on the Judiciary (known as the “Palermo
Declaration”). This model statute states that there shall be a supreme council of
magistracy, at least half of whom are judges and also including appointees of the
parliament. 22 The model statute also declares that the supreme council will produce a
budget for the courts, manage the administration, and control recruitment, assignment 23
and discipline of judges,24 thus guaranteeing judicial independence. The Council of
Europe made a similar recommendation in a document published in 1994.25

Other

international organizations have followed suit. 26
The motivating concern for adoption of councils in the French-Italian tradition
was ensuring independence of the judiciary after periods of undemocratic rule. To
entrench judicial independence, most of these countries enshrined the judicial council in
their constitution. Independence, however, is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon.
Even though judges may be independent from political control, they may become
dependent on other forces, such as senior judges in a judicial hierarchy—with just as
21

See Linn Hammergren, Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial Reform? Lessons from Latin America
(Working-Paper Series Democracy and Rule of Law Project 28, 2002). See also Pedro C. Magalhaes, The
Politics of Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe, 32 COMP. POL. 43-62 (1999) (discussing the judicial
institutional design in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland and how it relates to the bargaining process between
the different political actors); ); Pilar Domingo, Judicial Independence: The Politics of the Supreme Court
of Mexico, 32 J. LAT. AMER. STUD. 705 (2000) (arguing that specific constitutional reforms and the politics
of co-optation subordinated the judiciary to the dominant party until 1994); Peter H. Solomon, Putin’s
Judicial Reform: Making Judges Accountable as well as Independent, 11 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 117-23
(2002) (discussing the reforms to the Judicial Qualification Commission); Lauren Castaldi, Judicial
Independence Threatened in Venezuela: The Removal of Venezuelan Judges and the Complications of Rule
of Law Reform, 37 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 477 (2006) (discussing the current situation in Venezuela).
22

Art. 3.2.

23

Art. 3.1.

24

Subject to review by the Supreme Court. Art. 3.4.

25

Recommendation No.R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence,
Efficiency and Role of Judges (1994) (Council of Europe Recommendation), art. I.2.c
26

Violane Autheman & Sandra Elena, Global Best Practices-Judicial Councils: Lessons Learned from
Europe and Latin America, IFES, 2004 (arguing that judicial councils should be composed of a majority of
judges elected by their peers and should be tasked with selection, promotion, discipline, and training).

8

much potential to distort individual decision-making as more conventional political
influence.27 In civil law countries, in particular, a large proportion of judges are recruited
directly from law school using some form of public examination, with no or limited
requirements of previous professional experience. 28 This model emphasizes socialization
within the ranks of the judicial profession and creates the potential for institutional
pressures on judges to decide individual cases in ways that are at odds with their own
conscience or reading of the law.
Perhaps because of concerns over this structural problem, external accountability
has emerged as a second goal of councils. This is exemplified by the judicial councils in
some civil law countries, such as Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, that enjoy
fewer competences than do those in the French-Italian model. These councils are limited
to playing a role in selection (rather than promotion or discipline) of judges, or are
heavily influenced by regional and federal governments. The political impact of these
councils on the judiciary has been less clear than in the four European countries utilizing
the French-Italian model.29
Consider the Dutch case. Important reforms were recently introduced to ensure
more transparency and accountability but were not due to high profile political scandals.
The Dutch judiciary was historically very restrained, with a tradition of deference and a
strong concept of parliamentary sovereignty. The 1956 constitutional reform, designed to
accommodate the nascent European legal order, paved the way for more judicial activism
and judges gradually became more active in enforcing the European Convention of
Human Rights. 30 In 2002, a Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor de Rechtspraak) was
created to take primary responsibility for the organization and financing of the Dutch

27

See Owen Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 55-72 (Irwin Stotzky ed., 1993) (focusing on independence within the judicial
hierarchy).
28

Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7 CHI L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000).
29

See Thomas, supra note 10.

30

See THIJMAN KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 76-84 (2003) (describing the growth of
power of the Dutch judiciary).

9

Judiciary.31 The primary impetus for reforms has not been the judicialization of politics
but rather a perceived need for more accountability and better allocation of resources.
The councils in civil law jurisdictions vary in their relationship with the Supreme
Court. In some countries, such as Costa Rica and Austria, the judicial council is a
subordinate organ of the Supreme Court tasked with judicial management. 32 In other
countries, judicial councils are independent bodies with constitutional status. Further, in
some countries councils govern the entire judiciary, while in others they only govern
lower courts. 33
The case of Brazil is of special interest in this context. The Brazilian judiciary has
traditionally been considerably decentralized, very much influenced by the United States
model.34

Although there are serious administrative and financial advantages of

decentralization, it has also created serious drawbacks in terms of effective disciplinary
action and accountability. Brazil’s first judicial council was created in 1977. The primary
function of the council was disciplinary and it had no budgetary or administrative
functions. Though formally designed to provide the appearance of independence, the
1977 version of the judicial council did little to constrain potential military interference
with the courts. Indeed, judicial independence was in one sense greatest between 1988
and 2004, when judges enjoyed a vastly expanded domain of governance but had little
oversight. The association between the council and the dictatorship was the likely reason
for its abolition in 1988 with the return to democracy. Nevertheless, in 2004, Brazil
passed a constitutional amendment to introduce a new judicial council with a very
different structure from its predecessor. 35 Only with the recent reforms is there a promise

31

The creation of the Council for the Judiciary followed the Leemhuis Commission’s advice to the Minister
of Justice by the report “Updating the Administration of Justice”, in 1998.
32

The 1977 Brazilian council (Conselho Nacional da Magistratura) was another good example. However,
the 2004 council (Conselho Nacional de Justiça) has nine judges from different courts, including the ChiefJustice ex officio, two prosecutors, two lawyers (representatives of the bar association) and two laymen
appointed by the Senate and the House respectively.
33

Voermans & Albers, supra note 20, provide the examples of Guatemala and Argentina.

34

See the discussion by Maria Angela Oliveira, Reforming the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court: A
Comparative Approach, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 99 (2006).
35

The new model includes nine judges, two prosecutors, two lawyers, and two laymen appointed by the
legislature.

10

of a strong but politically accountable judiciary. It remains, of course, to be seen whether
this materializes.
Recruitment of the judiciary in common law countries has traditionally drawn
from more senior lawyers who have a wider range of previous experience and
socialization than do judges in the civil law jurisdictions. 36

Therefore, external

accountability has been a major motivating factor in shaping the design of judicial
appointment systems. Compared to the civil law judiciaries, common law judges have
relatively few opportunities for advancement, and hence there is less capacity for political
authorities to use the promise of higher office to influence judicial decision-making.37
Accordingly, appointments processes have received serious attention since judges are
fairly immune from pressures once appointed. In the United Kingdom, the Constitutional
Reform Act 2005 has created the Judicial Appointments Commission responsible for
appointments based solely on merit. 38 There is nevertheless a good deal of discussion as
to how to balance the merit principle with other functionalist goals such as affirmative
action and the Commission is anticipated to be able to produce a judiciary that is both
higher quality and more diverse.39 The advantages of a Judicial Appointment
36

See Georgakopoulos, supra note 28. Debate in common law countries tends to focus on the merits of the
appointees and diversity concerns. See, e.g., Kate Malleson, Selecting Judges in the Era of Devolution and
Human Rights, in Building the UK’s New Supreme Court, in NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
(Andrew Le Sueur ed., 2004).
37

Cf J. MARK RAMSEYER & E RIC RASMUSEN, MEASURING J UDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (2004) (documenting
political manipulation of judicial career structures in Japan). However, see David M. O’Brien & Yasou
Ohkoshi, Shifting Judicial Independence from Within: The Japanese Judiciary, in , J UDIC IAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY , C RIT ICAL P ERSPECTIVES AROUND THE WORLD (Peter
Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001) (arguing that Ramseyer and Rasmusen have misunderstood
the manipulation of the judiciary in Japan as political by the LDP when it is merely bureaucratic by
the faceless General Secretariat of the Supreme Court).
38

The composition of the JAC is fifteen, seven are judges and magistrates, two lawyers (one barrister and
one solicitor), and six are laymen (including the chairman). It started selecting judges in Apr. 2006. KATE
MALLESON, THE LEGAL SYSTEM ch. 17.40 (2005), argues that the JAC is effectively dominated by the
judiciary. The fact that the council is chaired by a non-lawyer does not seem to counter a strong judicial
membership. The traditional role of the Lord Chancellor in judicial appointments has been the object of
study by Anthony Bradney, The Judicial Activity of the Lord Chancellor 1946-1987: A Pellet, 16 J.L. &
SOC’Y 360 (1989).
39

For a discussion on the extent to which merit selection is consistent with affirmative action in the
judiciary, see Kate Malleson, Rethinking the Merit Principle in Judicial Selection, 33 J.L. & SOC’Y 126-40
(2006); see also Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role
of Appointment Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 SOCIAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY 504 (2002) (presenting empirical evidence that appointed systems of judicial selection produce
more diversity than election systems). The Canadian experience of provincial and federal advisory
committees has been appraised as a good model to promote women and minorities within the judiciary.

11

Commission have also been at the heart of the debate in New Zealand and in Australia,
where judicial appointments are still in the competence of the Attorney-General.
Currently, judicial appointment protocols have been developed to enhance independence
and external accountability (by including mandatory consultation with several office
holders).40
Within the common law world, the case of Singapore is also an interesting one
that illustrates the dangers of assuming that judicial involvement in appointments ensures
complete independence. There is a Legal Service Commission in Singapore, but its role
is somewhat limited. 41 The president appoints judges of the Supreme Court on the
recommendation of the prime minister after consultation with the Chief Justice. The
Legal Service Commission supervises and assigns the placement of the subordinate court
judges and magistrates who have the status of civil servants; however, the president
appoints subordinate court judges on the recommendation of the Chief Justice. 42 The
Chief Justice in Singapore is probably the most well-paid judge in the world, with a
salary of well over one million U.S. dollars, and the judiciary is widely praised for its
quality and independence. Nevertheless, it is also known for its docility in cases of great
importance to the ruling party. One might characterize this situation as being one in
which the bribes are legalized in the form of salaries, and in which the person of the

There are wide different models in Canada, but usually judges are not a majority in the council. The federal
committee has seven members, three laymen, three lawyers, and one judge. See Kate Malleson, The Use of
Judicial Appointment Commissions: A Review of the US and Canadian Models, Lord Chancellor’s
Department, Research Series 6/97, 1997.
40

Empirical analysis is provided by Mita Bhattacharya & Russell Smyth, 30 The Determinants of Judicial
Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the High Court of Australia, J. LEGAL STUD. 22352 (2001) and Pushkar Maitra & Russell Smyth, Judicial Independence, Judicial Promotion and the
Enforcement of Legislative Wealth Transfers - An Empirical Study of the New Zealand High Court, EUR.
J.L. & ECON., at 17 (2004). See also discussion by John M Williams, Judicial Independence in Australia,
in J UDIC IAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY , C RIT ICAL P ERSPECTIVES AROUND THE
WORLD ( Peter Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001) (showing that while the structural
guarantees are quite robust and few attempts have made to remove judges, there are serious
proposals for reform).
41

See Kim Teck Kim Seah, The Origins and Present Constitutional Position of Singapore’s Legal Service
Commission, SING. ACAD. L.J., at 2 (1990).
42

The judicial branch of the Legal Service Commission is headed by the Registrar of the Supreme Court
but the ultimate responsibility for managing lies with the Chief Justice.
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Chief Justice operates to ensure that lower judges do not stray from the formula of
independence in commercial cases but docility in political ones. 43
B. The American Experience
In many American states, concern over traditional methods of judicial selection
(either appointment by politicians or direct election by the public) led to the adoption of
“Merit Commissions” to remove partisan politics from judicial appointments and base
selection on merit. Merit Commissions can be seen as analogous to judicial councils,
though their scope of activity is more limited. Because in common law systems, the
judiciary is not a “career judiciary” in the civil law sense, there is less interest in having
independent commissions handle discipline, promotions, and reassignments, and greater
emphasis on initial appointments. The basic institutional design, however—namely
setting up non-partisan mixed bodies to screen and select judicial candidates—is similar
to the judicial commission.
Sometimes called the “Missouri Plan” (although some assert that it was first
adopted in California) or “Merit Plan,” this system features a non-partisan judicial
selection commission composed of judges, lawyers, and political appointees. 44 The
inspiration for this institution was a famous 1906 speech by Roscoe Pound and can be
seen as consistent with early twentieth century view in the value of technocracy and
administrative insulation from politics. 45

The Merit Commission is responsible for

nominating judges, exclusively in some states and in other states sending a set of
candidates from which the Governor chooses appointees. Merit Plan judges are typically
subject to uncontested retention elections but judges rarely lose these elections. 46 As of

43

Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception that Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008).

OF COURTS IN
44

In Missouri, the Commission has seven members: the Chief Justice, three lawyers elected by the bar from
different appellate districts, and three laypersons appointed by the Governor. For an analysis, see Hanssen,
supra note 1.
45

Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice, 20 J. AM. J UD.
SOC’Y 178 (1937).
46

Peter Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There one Best Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1
(1995); Reddick, supra note 3, at 10 (noting only thirty-three judges lost retention elections in the entire
United States between 1942 and 1978).
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1990, twenty-three states used the Merit Plan for initial appointment.

Most states

adopted these institutions in the 1960s and 1970s. 47
A general assumption in the literature is that Merit Plan systems will expand
independence. 48

For example, Hanssen tests the effect of partisan division on

appointment and retention systems, assuming that Merit Plan correlates with
independence. 49 He finds that, broadly speaking, states using merit plans tend to correlate
with higher levels of political competition (and hence presumed demand for judicial
independence) than those using partisan elections. 50 Hanssen also finds that states switch
to merit plans when they have increased party competition and policy differences
between parties. This is consistent with literature that emphasizes the role of partisan
competition in incentivizing judicial independence. 51
Nevertheless, we know of no study that has demonstrated an actual improvement
in judicial independence or quality after adoption of the Merit Plan, and the actual impact
on quality is debatable. 52 In a comprehensive review of the social scientific literature,
Reddick concludes that there is little support for “proponents’ claims that merit selection
insulates judicial selection from political forces, makes judges accountable to the public,
and identifies judges who are substantially different from judges chosen through other
systems.” 53 However, as Hanssen put it “(t)here is today a strong consensus that, of all

47

F. Andrew Hannsen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in State Courts, 33 J.
LEGAL STUD. 431-62 (2004).
48

See, e.g., Reddick, supra note 3 (reviewing literature).

49

Hanssen, supra note 1, at 721.

50

For at least one indicator, both these methods have less political competition on some indicators than the
residual category of “other” appointment methods (such as legislative or gubernatorial appointment. Id. at
720 (“In 95 percent of partisan election states the same party controlled both houses of the legislature,
versus in 87 percent of merit plan states and 81 percent of other states”).
51

J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 721 (1994); see also Tom
Ginsburg, J UDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (2003); Mathew Stephenson, When the Devil Turns . . .
The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review 32 J. LEG. STUD. 59 (2003); Lee Epstein et al.,
Selecting Selection Systems, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
APPROACH 191-226 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman, eds., 2002).
52

Webster, supra note 46; Henry Glick, The Promise and Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial
Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 519 (1978). See further discussion in Choi et al., supra
note 4.
53

Reddick, supra note 3, at 15 of manuscript.
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the procedures, the merit plan best insulates the state judiciary from partisan political
pressure.” 54
The nominating commission under the Merit Plan is essentially a judicial council
by another name, with its function limited to selection of judges. As a common law
country with judges that tend to be appointed relatively late in life, the United States has
little need for independent bodies to engage in promotion of judges.

Thus the

commissions play a relatively limited role, but focus on the crucial locus of partisan
pressure.

This illustrates the importance of understanding institutional variation in

conditioning demand for the judicial council model.
C. The British Experience
The British case is of particular significance given its recent reforms to a venerable
system. In 2003, Prime Minister Blair’s Government announced its intention to modify
the system for judicial appointments in England and Wales. The reform was justified as
advancing the twin goals of improving judicial independence and enhancing
accountability and public confidence. Although the independence of the judiciary was
confirmed in the Act of Settlement 1701, and since then strong norms of judicial
immunity have made it quite difficult to remove judges, appointments remained in the
hands of the Lord Chancellor, a senior government official. 55 The traditional view was
that the Lord Chancellor was the judiciary’s representative in the government and the
government’s representative to the judiciary, hence a unique office well placed to
represent the view of each side. 56 The English judiciary was never perceived to be a
separate branch of government in the American sense. 57
54

Furthermore, a system

Hanssen, supra note 47, at 452.

55

For example, Stevens mentions several important episodes of political interference with the judiciary
(including the right of the Crown not to reappoint judges on the change of a monarch) but notes the
declining role of the judiciary until the 1960s. He argues that the development of high formalism that
protected the English judiciary from possible political interference made the judiciary increasingly
irrelevant. See ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH J UDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE C HANGING CONSTITUTION
(2005), chs. 1 and 2. See also the recent volume BUILDING THE UK’S SUPREME COURT: NATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Andrew Le Seur ed., 2004)
56

See J. Steyn, The Case for a Supreme Court, 118 L. Q. R. 382 (contesting this view and emphasizing that
in practice the Lord Chancellor delegates to the Law Lords judicial business).
57

See J.A.G. GRIFFITH, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY (5th ed, 1999), at chs. 8 and 9, where he argues
that the myth of neutrality has undermined the building-up of a strong judiciary. The author defends a
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dependent on the Lord Chancellor created a unified and hierarchical judiciary. This
structure did not promote diversity of opinions since someone who did not conform to the
views of the establishment was not likely to be chosen by the Lord Chancellor for a
judicial post.
The increasing profile of the English judiciary in recent years has led to pressures
for more judicial accountability. The Pinochet case in 1999 raised serious questions about
having the most senior judiciary sitting at the House of Lords. 58 There have been
conflicts over sentencing in the aftermath of the Human Rights Act 1998.

Finally, the

case of McGonnell v. UK (2000) in the European Court of Human Rights concerning the
office of bailiff of the island of Guernsey had an important impact. 59 In that case, the
Court decided that a single official who serves as both a judge and in an administrative
role violates Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (although in
practice, in England and Wales, the Lord Chancellor has traditionally avoided sitting on
cases where there might be a conflict of interest). Another source of pressure for more
accountability has been the growth of judicial review and the perception that judicial
interference has increased significantly. 60
One important concern is the lack of minorities and women in the bench, thus
providing a sense of gender and racial bias in the appointments mechanism. Some have
expressed concern that a small clique from Oxford and Cambridge dominates the
appointments. 61 Furthermore, there have been indications of personal and corporate bias

political role of the judiciary in areas such as law and order or social issues. See also Stevens, supra note
55, at chs. 6 and 7, and ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE J USTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (1990).
58

The contradictory decisions taken by different panels of three Law Lords were not easily understood by
the public. For a detailed account, see Stevens, supra note 55, at ch. 8.
59

McGonnell v. UK (2000) 30 EHRR 289.

60

See, among others, Robert Stevens, A Loss of Innocence? Judicial Independence and the Separation of
Powers, 19 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 365 (1999) and Matthew Flinders, Mechanisms of Judicial
Accountability in British Central Government, 54 PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 54 (2001).
61

For an empirical analysis, see Jordi Blanes & Clare Leaver, An Economic Analysis of Judicial Diversity
Part I: Judicial Promotions, Oxford University mimeograph (2007). See also Griffith, supra note 57, at
18-21 and Herbert M. Kritzer, Courts, Justice and Politics in England, in COURTS, LAW AND POLITICS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 91, at 92 (Herbert Jacob et al. eds., 1996).
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in judicial profiles. 62

The demands for more diversity in the judiciary called for a new

method of judicial selection.
In 2003, Prime Minister Blair’s Government announced its intention to change the
system for making appointments to the judiciary in England and Wales. 63

The

Constitutional Reform Act 2005 introduced several substantive changes in England and
Wales, including a statutory duty on government members not to influence judicial
decisions. The most far-reaching reforms were the abolishment of the Lord Chancellor
with the transfer of his judicial functions (as the most senior judge in England and Wales)
to the President of the Courts of England and Wales (formerly known as Lord Chief
Justice of England and Wales), 64 and the creation of a new Supreme Court, with twelve
judges independent of and removed from the House of Lords with their own independent
appointment system. 65 And crucially, a Judicial Appointments Commission was created,
responsible for recommending candidates for judicial appointments on a more transparent
basis and based solely on merit.

D. Balancing Independence and Accountability
This brief survey illustrates that it is clearly impossible to eliminate political
pressure on the judiciary.

While adequate institutions might enhance judicial

independence and minimize the problems of a politicized judiciary, increasing the powers
and independence enjoyed by judges risks creating the opposite problem of over-

62

See GRIFFITH, supra note 57, at chs. 3 to 6.

63

In the case of Scotland, judicial appointments were under review since Sept. 1999 and an independent
Judicial Appointments Board was established in June 2002.
64

The President of the Courts of England and Wales sits in the Court of Appeal, the High Court and the
Crown Court, among others, is responsible for expressing the views of the judiciary and for welfare,
training, and guidance of the English judiciary. He is not the President of the Supreme Court.
65

The new Supreme Court is to be launched in 2008 with the current twelve Law Lords (the Lords of
Appeal in Ordinary). There will be a Supreme Court ad hoc selection committee presided by the President
of the Supreme Court for future appointments. The remaining Lords of Appeal who are members of the
House of Lords and eligible to hear and decide judicial business under the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876
will not be moved to the Supreme Court (in Jan. 2007, there were thirteen including three former Lord
Chancellors).
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judicializing public policy.66

It is our view that the periodic reforms of judicial

appointments and management that we observe within and across countries reflect a
dialectic tension between the need to de-politicize the judiciary and the trend toward
judicializing politics. Independence is needed to provide the benefits of judicial decisionmaking; once given independence, judges are useful for resolving a wider range of more
important disputes; but as more and more tasks are given to the judiciary, there is
pressure for greater accountability because the judiciary takes over more functions from
democratic processes.
Figure 1 presents a stylized summary of the recurrent calibration between
independence and external accountability, synthesizing the different experiences
discussed above. Begin in the upper right corner, a judiciary that has little independence
or influence. When judges carry little weight over public policy and politics, concerns
over independence tend to dominate and reformers may push for a move from a
politically dependent weak judiciary to a strong self-regulated judiciary (e.g., the FrenchItalian experience in the 1950s, or Spain and Portugal in the 1970s). This shift gives rise
to a judiciary that has some control over its own affairs.

Frequently, though not

inevitably, judges use this independence to increase their influence over public policy
(perhaps as a result of exogenous events). This is represented by a shift to the lower left
corner of Figure 1. However, once politics is judicialized in a significant way, pressures
arise for greater political accountability. The judiciary remains strong but is more subject
to oversight and control. As accountability becomes directed only to a small group of
principals and assaults on judicial independence are too successful, we may in some
circumstances observe a move from a politically accountable strong judiciary back to
politically dependent weak judiciary, as in a rising authoritarian regime. This dynamic
framework provides a tool for understanding the various institutional adjustments
observed in different countries.
Note that we are not asserting that movement across the various zones of the
figure is inevitable. Institutional configurations can be stable for long periods of time,
66

Stephen Burbank, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and Interbranch Relations (U. Pa. L.
Sch., Working Paper No. 102, 2006), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn/wps/papers/102 (arguing that
judicial independence in the United States is at a tipping point because of a characterization of judicial
politics as ordinary politics).
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and there is no necessary condition that judiciaries shift their location in the figure. What
we believe the figure does capture, however, is the potential for cycling among different
models of judicial governance and the nature of the pressures that judiciaries will face in
particular configurations. We return to these dynamics later in this Article.
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III. What do Councils Do?
A. Competences
Academic work on judicial councils has been so far quite limited. There are very
few empirical studies67 and there has been no economic or statistical analysis to date that
we know of. We have observed that judicial councils operate in very different legal
environments and, therefore, we need to understand the particularities before we can
compare the role and the powers of judicial councils across countries.
Broadly speaking, judicial councils have three important competences:
(i)

Housekeeping functions (managing budget, material resources, operations);

(ii)

Appointment of judges; and

(iii)

Performance evaluation (promotion, discipline, removal and retention of
judges, and judicial salaries).

For all of these functions, the key factor is effective calibration between judicial
independence and external accountability. This calibration will be achieved, for example,
by the composition or membership of the council, by the appointment mechanism, or by
sharing certain functions with other branches of the government or other bodies (even the
public in the case of elected judges). We do not assert that there is a universally optimal
balance between independence and accountability, but understand that there is a limit to
how far one can move in either direction within democracies. 68 Moving too far in either
direction may trigger pressures for a shift as idealized in Figure 1.
Whereas the first competence, housekeeping, is purely managerial, the second and
third competences are related to career incentives and more directly contribute to judicial
quality. Housekeeping functions deal with practical questions concerning the
organization and the running of the judiciary. 69 These functions can, of course,
67

But see Hammergren, supra note 21.

68

Hanssen, supra note 1.

69

We believe the primary rationale to be considered in assigning the task to a council is economies of scale
and specialization vis-a-vis alternative managers, such as the Ministry of Justice (arguably better able to do
things like purchasing supplies etc.) or the Supreme Court (a body that typically has little time or expertise
for management).
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potentially affect judicial independence—for example, if material incentives are used to
reward certain types of judges. Obviously managerial competences are also important for
the efficiency of courts and, in that respect, shape the quality of the legal system.
Nevertheless, the other two competences (appointment and performance evaluation) are
more directly related to judicial career incentives. If institutions matter for judicial
quality, they matter because of their impact on judicial incentives.
B. Composition
Councils also vary in composition. The council is composed of three possible
types of members, (i) judges, (ii) members of other government bodies or their
appointees, and (iii) lawyers. Judges on the Council are typically appointed by the
Supreme Court or by other courts, while lawyers are appointed by the law society/bar
association. Members of government bodies are typically appointed by their
organizations.
A general assumption in the literature is that a judicial majority on the council
will ensure independence. However, even when the judges are not a numerical majority
in the council, they might have a dominant or preponderant role for three reasons. First,
most members of a judicial council must rely on information provided by the judiciary
itself. Second, a judicial council does not exert direct control over the judiciary (which
would hurt the independence of judiciary) but exercises a configuration of powers that
mix authority and accountability. This configuration is usually complex and full of
uncertainties that usually call for expertise by judges.

Third, judges may have

particularly strong incentives to represent judicial interests on the council: after their
service on the council, judges will return to their professional careers inside the judiciary
whereas the non-judges will go back to their careers outside of the judiciary, which may
or may not have any relationship with judicial management issues.
C. The Interaction of Competence and Composition
We are particularly interested in whether composition correlates with powers.
One hypothesis is that judges will resist external regulation and control. Therefore if
non-judges are the majority on the council, we might observe that the Council is given
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less substantive powers, but when judges are the majority, powers are high. A competing
hypothesis is that judicial councils (a relatively late historical development) have been set
up to control judges and ensure accountability. If this were the case, we should see the
percent of judges on the council negatively correlated with the extent of powers. 70
We can frame this as the question of whether judicial councils are set up to ensure
independence of judges from the principals or accountability to the principals (see Figure
1). If judges are a majority on the council, the assumption is that judges utilize the
council to exercise self-government and maintain independence. If judges are a minority
on the council, the assumption is that the council is a device to constrain the judges and
render them more accountable.

These two types of councils reflect quite different

goals.71
To summarize, judicial councils will vary in terms of their competencies and their
structures.

Interacting competences with composition, we can imagine different

configurations.

We view extensive competence of a judicial council as enhancing

judicial accountability. We follow the conventional wisdom that assumes that judicial
majorities on the judicial council promote independence. Interacting these two
dimensions, we can see that there are several possible configurations (see Figure 2).
Extensive competences create strong councils whereas those limited to housekeeping
functions are considered weak councils. Judicial dominance of the council means that
they are less likely to be politicized. Nevertheless, the shape of the council will depend
on whether or not the judges in the council behave as a homogeneous body. That is
easily achieved when judges come from superior courts since these judges will tend to
reinforce the judicial hierarchy. If the judges come from various different courts, there
may be intra-judicial politics that prevent the judiciary from acting in unified fashion: we
may sometime observe the emergence of judicial associations or unions that provide a
solution to collective action problems.

70

On the other hand, the politics of setting up the councils may vary greatly depending on local
circumstances, in particular the historical balance of power between government and Supreme Court. For
example, the extent to which the justices are easily captured by the government will result in different
models of judicial council.
71

Hanssen’s data from the United States suggests that the timing of the adoption of council-type
mechanisms reflects these motivations.
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Figure 2 displays the various models, along with some examples of their
operation.
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FIGURE 2
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This discussion suggests that councils are not all of a same type. Local institutional
problems, represented by the location in Figure 1, will produce pressures for different
types of councils in different circumstances. Even within a country, we may see variation
over time as different institutional problems arise.
IV. Empirical Data on Councils
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We have developed a small database on Judicial Councils (see Appendix). The
sample consists of the councils in 121 different nation-states. Data was gathered for the
most recent iteration of the judicial council available. For ninety-three countries, the
Judicial Council is mentioned and described in the country’s constitution, so we gathered
our information from there. 72 For twenty-eight other countries, the Judicial Council is
not mentioned in the Constitution, or it provides no detail on the composition and powers
of the Judicial Council. In these countries, the Judicial Council is left to ordinary law.
We gathered data on these countries from an array of sources, including the 2002 study of
Hammergren73 and a number of country-specific sources. Figures 3a and 3b provide
some indication of the trends over time and space.
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FIGURE 3a: CONSTITUTIONALIZED JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS OVER TIME
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This data is from the Comparative Constitutions Project at the University of Illinois; available at
www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org
73

Hammergren, supra note 21.
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Note that the issue of whether or not a council is constitutionalized is itself
interesting. If the composition and powers of the council are left to ordinary law, they are
subject to enhanced manipulation by the government and other actors and hence less of a
guarantee of independence.

Presumably those councils lean more toward the

accountability pole than the independence pole. Conversely, when the council structure is
entrenched in the constitution, it is beyond the reach of ordinary politics and hence likely
to reflect a desire for greater levels of judicial independence and insulation. In the results
that follow, we predict and find systematically lower independence scores for countries
with non-constitutionalized councils.74

74

Judicial independence on every measure is lower for these countries. Countries with constitutionalized
judicial councils have a mean De Facto Independence (Voigt) score of .51, while those with
nonconstitutionalized councils have score .41, though the n is too low to determine a significant difference
in means. Using Howard and Carey’s measure of judicial independence, the means are .47 and .16
respectively, significant at the .01 level.
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First, we developed a simple ordinal index of powers/competences (“Power
Index”). Each judicial council was rated depending on the extent of its competences. A
council that had purely administrative or housekeeping functions council was coded as 1;
a council with a role in appointment, transfer, and discipline of judges was rated a 3. The
intermediate rating of 2 was given to councils that had a limited role either because they
could appoint but not discipline judges, or their role was limited in performance-relevant
variables. For example, a council that only had a role in recommending judges for
appointment or minimal role in discipline would be rated a 2.

We also include

information on countries without judicial councils, an important control group. These are
denoted by power index 0. A complete coding of countries with judicial councils is in
the Appendix.
Our first prediction was that competences would vary systematically depending
on the institutional problem that is faced. Extensive competences correlate with stronger
councils. Stronger councils, however, can reflect demands for strong political control
and accountability—or judicial self-regulation effectuated by capture of the council.
Sorting out which motivation exists in particular contexts is difficult. To evaluate this
issue, we use the working assumption that a majority of judges on the council indicates a
greater degree of judicial self-regulation.
A. Power of Judges and Institutional Structure
When judges have extensive powers, judicialization of public policy is likely to
follow. In such environments the judicial council may reflect demands for control and
accountability. We expect this will be more likely in common law countries as well as
any country in which ordinary judges can engage in the power of judicial review. By
contrast, where judicial review is limited to a specially designated constitutional court,
we do not expect to observe the same level of demand for accountability of the ordinary
judiciary, of the type associated with judicial councils. This is because the major issues
of social policy will more likely be constitutionalized, so the constitutional court will
insulate the ordinary judiciary from politicization, to some degree.
We find only partial support for these conjectures in the descriptive data. Where
judicial review is conducted by ordinary courts, competences are less likely to be
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extensive. In general, common law judicial councils are more likely to have extensive
powers, not less.
On the other hand, both common law systems and those in which ordinary courts have
the power of judicial review are less likely to have a majority of judges on the council,
indicating some desire for external control of judges. (Note that the last column ofFigure
4 is based on a smaller sample of countries because data on Council composition was
unavailable for some systems.)
FIGURE 4:
JUDICIAL POWERS, COUNCIL COMPETENCE AND COMPOSITION
Feature of Court
System
Judicial Review
by ordinary
courts?
Common Law?

1

Judicial Council Power Index
2

3

9%

44%

47%

Judicial
Majority on
Council?
40%

8%

34%

58%

42%

To understand the relationship between composition and competence, we divide
our sample into three groups using to the power index. We then examine whether an
assignment of more extensive powers is associated with a higher percentage of judges on
the council. Our results exclude cases for which all information is not available; this
leaves seventy-four cases. In addition, we can ignore the small number of councils with
purely managerial functions. Councils with the full array of powers have, at the mean, a
(bare) majority of judges; councils with reduced powers have a minority of judges. 75
Using the median rather than mean levels illustrates the difference more starkly: the
median council with the full array of powers has sixty percent judges; the median council
with reduced powers has twenty-nine percent judges.

75

A difference of means test gives a t-stat of -1.48 (85% confidence level), indicating close to statistical
significance.
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FIGURE 5
PERCENTAGE OF JUDGES ON COUNCIL, BY POWER INDEX
Power

Mean %

Std.

index

of judges N

Deviation

1

.75

5

.28

2

.39

31

.32

3

.50

38

.29

Total

.47

74

.31

In short, powers and composition go together, but in two different configurations.
When councils are very weak (power index 1), judicial involvement is extensive. When
powers are extensive (power index 3), judicial involvement is also relatively high. In the
intermediate situation, judicial involvement is lower.

We interpret this finding as

reflecting the upper right and lower left quadrants of Figure 1. Judicial involvement can
be extensive when it does not matter much; but it can also reflect a very powerful and
independent judiciary that is extensively involved in politics.
B. Regime Type
It is possible that regime type can play some role in sorting out the various
configurations we observe. We predict that autocracies will feature councils with weak
competences (ineffectual council) or strong competences/fewer judges (for greater
political control). 76 For democracies, we predict greater variety, depending on other
elements of the institutional configuration. To explore this, we divide constitutions
containing provisions on judicial councils into three categories: those that are written in
autocracies, those written in established democracies, and those written in transitions
between autocracy and democracy. 77

We use data available from political scientist

Carles Boix, who uses other generally available data to make binary characterizations of

76

Logit regression confirms the direction of this relationship, although not at statistically significant levels.

77

There are no cases in our sample of democracies transitioning to autocracies.
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countries as autocracies or democracies in a large time-series.78

We find that the

percentage of judges tends to be lower in autocracies rather than democracies, although ttests indicate the difference of means is not quite significant.

Still, the crude data

indicates a mild tendency of autocracies to distrust judges.
FIGURE 6
PERCENTAGE OF JUDGES ON COUNCIL, BY REGIME TYPE
Regime type

Mean % of judges

N

Std. Deviation

Autocracy

.38

29

.30

New Democracy

.48

25

.33

.47

30

.30

.43

84

.32

Established
democracy
Total

C. Councils and Independence
Finally, we wish to examine whether the variables of composition and
competence correlate with variables such as judicial quality and independence. This is an
important question given that judicial councils are offered as a “best practice” to promote
judicial independence.

As an initial step, we use the Judicial Independence scores

produced by Howard and Carey (2004).79 They analyzed the U.S. Department of State’s
Annual Human Rights Reports for a series of years in the 1990s to produce dummy

78

CARLES BOIX, DEMOCRACY AND REDISTRIBUTION (2000); Carles Boix, Constitutions and Democratic
Breakdowns, paper presented at Comparative Law and Economics Forum, Chicago (Oct. 2005). For each
constitution, the country’s autocracy/democracy status was considered for the five years preceding the
constitution and immediately afterwards. If the country was rated a democracy in the year of or
immediately following the promulgation of the constitution, and had been an autocracy at any time in the
five preceding years without an intervening constitution, it was considered to have undergone a transition
from autocracy to democracy.
79

Robert Howard & Henry A. Carey, Courts and Political Freedom: A Measure of Judicial Independence,
87 JUDICATURE 285 (2004).
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variables for individual, collective, and overall judicial independence. We used the last
year available (typically 1999).80

FIGURE 7
JUDICIAL

INDEPENDENCE

(HOWARD-CAREY

“INDIVIDUAL

INDEPENDENCE”), BY POWER INDEX
Power

Std.

index

Mean

N

Deviation

1

.57

7

.53

2

.55

40

.50

3

.67

51

.47

Total

.61

98

.49

Here again we see a trend toward more independence with greater competences of
the judicial council, suggesting that perhaps councils do increase independence as their
proponents assert. There is a potential problem, however: any index that draws on formal
structures for the definition of judicial independence raises endogeneity problems. It is
possible, for example, that the State Department’s assessment is itself affected by
whether or not a country has a judicial council. To overcome this problem, we need to
examine judicial independence as exists on the ground, rather than relying on formal or
structural independence. While this is somewhat difficult to assess, we are fortunate that
Professor Voigt and his co-authors have developed separate indices for de facto and de
jure independence. 81 Voigt’s de facto index is composed of a number of variables that
are likely to impact actual levels of independence, such as the number of times rules
80

We focus on their “individual independence” score, which exhibits much more variance than their
collective independence indicator.
81

Lars Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross-Country Evidence Using
a new set of Indicators, 19(3) EUR. J. POL. ECON. 497-527 (2003); Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Explaining
De Facto Judicial Independence, Marburg Papers on Economics No. 07-2005 (2005), available at
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/gelbereihe/artikel/2005-07-hayo.pdf (last visited Aug.
10, 2007).
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governing appointment or court structure have changed, whether judicial budgets and
income have remained constant, whether judges have been removed from office, and
instances of non-implementation of judicial decisions. Using this more refined index, it
does not appear obvious that de facto judicial independence scores increase with the level
of powers for the judicial council.
FIGURE 8
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE DE FACTO (VOIGT), BY POWER INDEX
Power index

Mean

N

Std. Deviation

1

.56

5

.24

2

.51

15

.25

3

.50

26

.23

Total

.51

46

.23

We also can consider the effect of various features of judicial councils on metrics
of judicial independence.

Figure 9 presents four models using different dependent

variables measuring different aspects of judicial independence and quality. In each case,
we examine the effects of two different features of judicial councils widely believed to
enhance independence: strong powers and a majority of judges on the council. In no case
do either of these indicators approach statistical significance when controlling for
common law and GDP. These results are robust to alternative specifications when each
feature is included on its own.

We find no evidence in support of the presumed

relationship between council structure and judicial independence or quality.
A final bit of evidence comes from preliminary analysis of World Bank Rule of
Law data on those countries which appear to have adopted a judicial council after 1996.
This data shows that more countries suffered a decline in quality of rule of law than an
increase.

Thirty-nine countries suffered a decline in Rule of Law rating between

adoption and 2005, whereas only twenty-seven countries showed an increase. 82 It seems
82

Data on file with authors.
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that the emergence of judicial councils as an international “best practice” for promoting
judicial independence and quality may be unjustified.

FIGURE

9:

COUNCIL

FEATURES

AS

PREDICTORS

OF

JUDICIAL

INDEPENDENCE

Dependent Rule of Law Index83
Variable
Constant
Percent of
judges on
council
Strong
powers of
council
Common
law
dummy
GDP per
capita
R2

-1.08
0.21

De Facto

Judicial Independence85

Judicial Independence84
0.41
0.15

Judicial
Quality/Formalism86

0.31
0.08

0.25
0.10

0.08

0.00

0.10
0.05

.22*

-0.16**

0.18

.01***

.01*

.00***

0.16
.01**

.78

.23

.45

.19

* = significant at the 10% confidence level; ** = significant at the 5% confidence level; *** = significant at
the 1% confidence level

The above results suggest the need to focus on a more dynamic model of council
structure. Clearly the effects are not linear. Rather, there is a complex relationship
between council structure and political incentives of the various actors at the time of
adoption. Ideally, we would be able to model the decision to adopt a judicial council as a
83

World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2006, available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:2077116
5~menuPK:1866365~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html.
84

See supra note 81.

85

See Howard & Carey, supra note 79.

86

Simeon Djankov et al., Courts: The Lex Mundi Project, CEPR Discussion Papers 3344 (2002).
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product of the political factors we identify.

However, we face two daunting data

challenges that prevent us from specifying such a model.

First, we would need

comprehensive data on the judicial appointment systems of all countries, including those
without a council, before and after the adoption. Although Hanssen was able to gather
some such data in the United States, we have found no comparable sources across a large
number of countries. 87 Second, we would need refined indicators of political variation
across countries over time. We are not convinced that any one indicator would serve as
an ideal proxy for the myriad conditions that lead countries to adopt judicial councils.
Our preliminary conclusion, then, is that there is no evidence that judicial councils
promote independence.

VI. Conclusion
This Article is a first examination of judicial councils, a relatively new institution
associated with attempts to enhance judicial independence. We began by providing a
comprehensive view of common-law judicial appointment commissions and civil-law
high judicial councils. We have argued that the different designs aim at achieving the
appropriate balance between independence and accountability in the face of two recurrent
phenomena: the politicization of the judiciary and the judicialization of politics. We
provide a typology of judicial councils by looking at two crucial elements, composition
and competences, and test their interactions.
Our empirical observation of patterns of institutional design show that
competence and composition interact in complex ways to respond to particular
institutional problems. We also found little evidence in favor of the widespread
assumption that councils increase quality or independence in the aggregate. Therefore,
we emphasize the complexity of the role of a judicial council and reject the simplistic
view that importing or transplanting certain types of judicial council is likely to have a
decisive impact on the quality of the judiciary. We thus reject the view of international

87

Cf. Hannsen, supra note 47.
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organizations that assert that judges should always and everywhere form the majority of
members on the Council. 88
Our framework also explains why it is that councils persist as institutions.
Because they involve actors from multiple different arenas, the council itself promises
that no one institution can easily dominate the judiciary. The councils, once created,
provide an arena for competition and the eternal struggle to calibrate independence and
accountability. We thus predict that councils themselves will frequently become the
targets of institutional reform, as examples from Italy, Brazil and elsewhere
demonstrated. 89

We also can understand why they have been widely adopted,

notwithstanding little support for claims that they enhance independence: councils allow
a wide number of stakeholders to participate in discussions of judicial governance.
Finally, we introduce the notion of the politically accountable but strong
judiciary. In many ways, this ideal type is more desirable than the conventional view that
judicial independence is an unqualified good.

Those who emphasize judicial

independence too often do not articulate the need for accountability, which provides the
crucial other side of the proverbial coin.
These findings have important implications for the ongoing debate on judicial
appointments in the United States. Rather than assume that merit commissions, the
American counterpart to judicial councils, always enhance independence, scholars should
conduct more thorough empirical research to understand the precise determinants of
independence and accountability. Our case studies suggest that these determinants are
highly context-specific and not susceptible to one-size-fits-all solutions.

88

Autheman & Elena, supra note 26.

89

Autheman & Elena, supra note 26, provide a very interesting report of survey data from five Central
American countries. Respondents in those countries that had a judicial council reported that the Council
had had a negative impact on judicial independence. Respondents in those countries that did not have a
judicial council felt that adopting a judicial council would increase judicial independence. Id. at 4. These
two results are not contradictory from our point of view. First, the two sets of countries have different
starting places and are likely to vary systematically. Second, the countries that have adopted judicial
councils may have done so to enhance accountability rather than independence, in which case, respondents
are observing a successful institution.
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APPENDIX: DATA ON JUDICIAL COUNCILS

Country
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African
Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Costa Rica
Cote D'Ivoire
Croatia
Cyprus
Democratic Republic
of Congo
Dominica
East Timor
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
France

Number
of
Members
15
.
5
19
.
14
.
.
3
5
.
4
.
.
8
3
5
25
.
15
.
9
.
.
.
.

Proportion
of Judges
0.67
.
0.2
0.58
0.25
0.64
.
.
1
0.2
0.5
0.25
.
0.2
0
0.5
1
0.52
.
0.47
.
0.33

Power
Index

.
.

.

.

.
.
.
.

.
2
3
2
3
2
2
.
3
1
3
2
3
3
.
3

0
13

3
3
2
3
2
3
3

.
.

1
.

3
.

0.6

1

2
2
3
3

0.29
0.4
0.13

2
2
3
3

.
.
8

.

.
5
5
8

.

.
6
7

.
.

.
0
0

.
.
3
17

0.33
0.46

2
.
2
3
3
3
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Gabon
Gambia
Guatemala
Ghana
Greece
Guyana
Hungary
Indonesia
Iraq
Israel
Italy/Sardinia
Jamaica
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Republic of Congo
Romania
Rwanda
Saint Vincent
Samoa

7
9
5
5
5
.
.
.

0.57
0.38
0.6
0.8
1

3
2
2
1
3
3
1
2
2
2
3
1
2
3

.
1
0
1
0.33
0.6
0.33
0
0.6

3
9
.
6
.
5
.
.

.
.
15
4

.

.
3
0.53
0.25

.
3
3
3
1
3

.
7

.
.

0
.
.

2
.

0

.

.
10
3
4
4
11

.
.

2
2
3
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3

0.5
0.33
0.5
1
0.55
.
0.86
0.56
0.25
0.6

16
4
5
.

.
3
5
7
8
5
8
7

1
1
0.14
0.63
0.4
0.13
0.14
0.22

.
15
17
.

.

.
0.47
.

19
.
.

0.79
1
.

3

0.33

2
.
.
1
.
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
2
2
3
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Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
Solomon
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Zambia
Zimbabwe

.

.
3
4
6

.

2
2
2
3
3
2
2
2

0
0.5
0.4
.

11
4
.

0.55
0.25
.

23
22
3
.
.
.

0.13
0.59
1

.
.
3
1
3
2
3
3
3
3

.
.
0
0.5
0.87
0.78
0.4

6
15
9
.
.

.
7

0
0

.
20
7
4
8
.

.

.
0.43
0.25
0.5
.

6

0.17

3
3
3
3
2
3
3
2

Key: Power Index has value 1 for purely administrative functions, value
2 for involvement in appointments, and value 3 for roles in both
appointment and discipline, removal or promotion of judges.
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